THE NEURAL BASIS OF HUMAN MORAL COGNITION

From Nature Reviews Neuroscience 6, 799-809 (2005); doi:10.1038/nrn1768

Moral cognitive neuroscience is an emerging field of research that focuses on the neural basis of uniquely human forms of social cognition and behaviour. Recent functional imaging and clinical evidence indicates that a remarkably consistent network of brain regions is involved in moral cognition. These findings are fostering new interpretations of social behavioural impairments in patients with brain dysfunction, and require new approaches to enable us to understand the complex links between individuals and society. Here, we propose a cognitive neuroscience view of how cultural and context-dependent knowledge, semantic social knowledge and motivational states can be integrated to explain complex aspects of human moral cognition.

At a time of increasing awareness of the different value systems in multicultural societies and across nations, a deeper understanding of the cognitive and brain mechanisms that guide human behaviour is of general interest. Recent social cognitive neuroscience reviews have emphasized perceptual and emotional abilities that are shared by humans and other animals. However, social neuroscience has largely avoided dealing directly with the complex aspects of human moral cognition, including MORAL EMOTIONS and MORAL VALUES. Here, we review current theoretical accounts of social cognition and put forth a framework designed to overcome the main limitations of earlier accounts. We argue that moral phenomena emerge from the integration of contextual social knowledge, represented as event knowledge in the prefrontal cortex (PFC); social semantic knowledge, stored in the anterior and posterior temporal cortex; and motivational and basic emotional states, which depend on cortical–limbic circuits. Our framework offers new interpretations for social behaviour patterns in healthy individuals and in patients with brain dysfunction, and makes testable predictions for neuropsychological dissociations in moral cognition.